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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a simple Chamberlinian agglomeration model which, like the canonical
core-periphery (CP) model, contains two agglomerative forces. However, in contrast to that
model, the present model is analytically solvable. Moreover, the present model exhibits a
'supercritical pitchfork bifurcation' rather than the 'subcritical pitchfork bifurcation' of the CP
model. This may be a better description for some agglomerative processes than the
'catastrophic' emergence of complete agglomeration predicted by the CP model.
                                                
* PD Dr. Michael Pflüger, DIW Berlin, Königin-Luise-Straße 5, 14195 Berlin. Tel (Fax) 030/89789-154 (114).
E-mail: mpflueger@diw.de1
1. Introduction
The spatial aspects of the economy are at the heart of the ‘new economic geography’ which
was launched with the seminal works by Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995) and
Venables (1996). The analytical essence of the new economic geography is contained in the
‘core-periphery (CP) model’.1 This shows how the interactions among transport costs,
increasing returns at the firm level, and supply and demand linkages shape and change the
location of economic activity. In order to bring these interactions out clearly, this model is
built around a set of simplifying assumptions which have become canonical (e.g.
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, Cobb-Douglas
upper-tier utility and iceberg transport costs). It has been perceived as a weakness that, these
simplifications notwithstanding, only certain aspects of the CP model are analytically
tractable. The model generally has to be solved by numerical simulation. This may be part of
the reason why the analysis of the policy implications of the new economic geography, which
would necessitate further complications of the model, is yet not fully developped. An
analytically solvable case of the CP model has been worked out by Forslid (1999), however.2
Due to its solvability, this model has proven useful for analyses in the field of capital and
income tax competition (Andersson and Forslid, 1999; Baldwin and Krugman, 2000).
This paper presents an alternative model that can be solved analytically and is even simpler
than the model of Forslid (1999). The gain in simplicity derives from the substitution of the
Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility with a quasi-linear function. With this modification, the two
agglomerative forces contained in his model are still at work but the quasi-linear utility
removes all income effects from the manufacturing sector, in which agglomerative forces
appear. Moreover, the modified model has the implication that, when transport costs are
lowered, a different type of bifurcation arises. The CP model exhibits a ‘subcritical pitchfork
bifurcation’.3 When transport costs are at a certain level (the sustain point), two stable fully
agglomerative equilibria appear in addition to the initial symmetric equilibrium. At a still
lower level of transport costs (the break point), the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable.
The model presented here exhibits a ‘supercritical pitchfork bifurcation’. At a certain level of
                                                
1 The core-periphery model is conveniently laid out in Fujita et. al (1999, Ch. 4 and Ch. 5) and elaborated on and
critically assessed in Neary (2001) and Baldwin et.al. (2001).
2 Ottaviano (2001, 1996) has independently developped the dynamic version of this model. A synthesis of
Ottaviano (1996) and Forslid (1999) is provided in Forslid and Ottaviano (2002). Solvable models departing
from the CP model have also been provided by Baldwin (1999), who stresses factor accumulation and by
Ottaviano et. al. (2002), who work out a Chamberlinian setting without CES preferences.2
transport costs, the initial symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and two stable asymmetric
equilibria emerge which are increasingly asymmetric as transport costs are lowered.4 This
feature may be a better description for some of the agglomerative processes that are initiated
by economic integration (decreasing transport costs) than the 'catastrophic' emergence of
complete agglomeration predicted by the CP model.
2. The Model
The model builds on Forslids adaptation of the CP model which achieves its solvability by
assuming that the fixed cost in the manufacturing sector consists of a separate internationally
mobile factor as in Flam and Helpman (1987).5 Here we combine this model with the
assumption that the upper-tier utility is quasi-linear rather than Cobb-Douglas drawing on a
widely used specification (e.g. Dixit, 1990, Ch.3).
The world is composed of two countries, home and foreign (denoted by an asterisk (*)), two
factors of production, labor (L) and human capital (K ), and two sectors, manufacturing ( X )
and agriculture ( A). Labor is intersectorally mobile. Countries are assumed to have identical
preferences, technology and trade costs. In the long-run, human capital is assumed to be
mobile internationally, while labor is not. The agricultural good is homogeneous, traded
without costs and produced perfectly competitively under constant returns with labor as the
only input. This good is the numéraire and assumed to be produced in both countries after
trade. The monopolistically competitive  X  sector employs both factors to produce
differentiated goods with a linear cost function. Labor is the only variable input. Human
capital enters only the fixed cost. One unit of it is needed (for R&D or headquarter services) to
produce at all. Trade in  X  is inhibited by iceberg costs.
There are  K L  households, L laborers and K  human capital owners each of whom supplies
one unit of labor and human capital, respectively. Their wages are denoted by W  and R,
respectively. Each household's preferences are characterised by:6
                                                                                                                                                        
3 A simple introduction to bifurcations is provided in Fujita et. al. (1999, appx. to Ch. 3). A technical
development can be found in Grandmont (1988).
4 Supercritical pitchfork bifurcations are also obtained under certain other modifications of the CP model. I
return to this below (cf. footnote 12).
5 This assumption is also central in Ottaviano’s (2001) dynamic model.
6 Martin and Rogers (1995) and Pflüger (2001) use this preference specification in non-agglomeration contexts.
A similar specification is used in Helpman and Krugman (1989, Ch. 7).3
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where  X C  is the manufacturing aggregate,  A C  is the consumption of the agricultural good,  i x
( j x ) is the quantity consumed of a domestic variety i (foreign variety  j ),  N  and  * N  are the
number of varieties produced in home and foreign and   is the elasticity of substitution
between manufacturing varieties. The budget constraint is given by
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where  Y  denotes the household’s income, P  is the perfect CES-price index,  i P  ( j P ) is the
price set by a domestic (foreign) firm. Iceberg transport costs are formalised by the constant
 . These imply that only   / 1  of a unit of a foreign variety arrives for consumption and that
the consumer price of an imported variety is  j P  . Utility maximisation yields the demand
functions and indirect utility, V :7
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Choosing units and letting  A L  denote labour input, the production function of the agricultural
good is  A A L X  . Perfect competition ensures that this good is priced at marginal (which is
also average) cost. Since this good is the numéraire, the wage rate is unity,  1  W .
Market clearing for domestic variety i is expressed by    
*
i i i x * K * L x K L X      , where
i X  is production and 
*
i x  is the demand of the foreign representative household. Part of
demand is indirect, caused by transport losses. Each product type is supplied by a single firm.
With  1  W  and the technology  i i cX L   ( 0  c , a constant), the marginal cost is given by c.
The fixed cost due to the requirement of one unit of human capital is given by R . Let the
producer prices charged to domestic (foreign) households be denoted  i P  (
*
i P ). Profits of the
representative firm in the home region,  i  , are then given by:
     R x * K * L c * P x K L c P
*
i i i i i          (5)4
With the Chamberlinian large group assumption, profit maximising prices are constant
markups on marginal costs:
 1      / c * P P i i (6)
The compensation of human capital adjusts so as to ensure zero profit equilibrium. Using the
market clearing condition, a relationship between firm scale  i X  and fixed costs R obtains:
 c / R Xi 1    .( 7 )
3. Short-Run Equilibrium
In the short-run, human capital is immobile between countries so that  K N   and  * K * N  .
With free trade in goods, and using (2), (3), (5), (6) and their foreign counterparts, the zero
profit conditions in home and foreign are given by:
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   . Human capital's compensation in home and foreign in the short-run
equilibrium, R  and  * R , can directly be read of (8). This is the simplification obtained by the
quasi-linear upper tier utility which eliminates all income effects from the manufacturing
sector. With a Cobb-Douglas, domestic and foreign incomes enter in the numerators of (8)
which then have to be solved simultaneously. Once R  is derived, the firm scale  i X  follows
directly from (7) and all other endogenous variables can be derived in a straightforward way.
The  X  sector employs   1    NR NcX i  units of labor (using (7)) which we assume to be
less than L in order to fulfill the assumption that both sectors are active after trade. Formally,
this leads to the condition     1 1 2 /         where   * / K K L    .8
4. Long-Run Equilibrium
In the long run, human capital owners are internationally mobile and will move to the region
where their indirect utility is higher. The utility differential,     * / * ln * R R P P V V      ,
can easily be derived analytically for general trade costs in this model:
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where    is as defined before,   * / K K K     and   * / * * K K L    . A long-run
equilibrium in which both regions produce manufactures is given when  0   * V V . It is
easily verified that  2 1/    is always such an equilibrium with identical countries. However,
this equilibrium is not necessarily stable because the model contains two agglomerative
forces. There is a supply linkage as the region with the higher share of human capital has a
larger manufacturing sector and therefore a lower price index. This is captured in the first term
in (9). There is also a demand linkage since increasing the share of human capital in one
region implies a larger market. This raises the profitability of firms as expressed by the
differential  * R R  and thus attracts more human capital. The demand linkage is captured in
the second term in (9). Transport costs act as a stabilising force in this model, i.e. tend to
disperse production. When transport costs are increased it becomes more profitable for firms
to locate near the immobile customers.9
Figures 1 and 2 about here
Fig. 1 depicts (9) for different levels of trade costs and for the parameter values
3 . 0 ; 6 ; 1 *         . For high trade costs, the utility differential is monotonically falling
and the symmetric equilibrium is stable. It becomes unstable for lower trade costs and two
stable asymmetric equilibria emerge which become increasingly asymmetric when trade costs
are continuously reduced. For still lower trade costs, the utility differential slopes up
monotonically implying that these asymmetric equilibria involve full specialisation in one of
the countries. When trade costs are nil, difference doesn't matter in the model and human
capital owners are indifferent where to locate.
Fig. 2 depicts the stable equilibria in the corresponding bifurcation diagram. The model
exhibits a 'supercritical pitchfork bifurcation'. An analytical expression for the level of
transport costs at which the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable and the two arms of the
                                                                                                                                                        
8 It can be straightforwardly shown that the product  NR achieves its maximum at  * K K N   . In that case it
follows that      / 1 2   R  and the formal condition stated above is then obtained immediately.
9 As in the CP model we want to rule out that the agglomerative forces are so strong that the symmetric
equilibrium is unstable even at high (infinite) trade costs (Fujita et.al. 1999). In the present model this ‘no-black-
hole-condition’ commands:      2 1 /   .6
fork appear can be obtained by using (9) and the condition   0 / *      V V  at  2 / 1   .
This yields:10               
       
 1 2 2 3 / 2 1 2
1
c c . By differentiation,
0 /    c . Intuitively, the critical level of transport costs at which the symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable has to be lower, when the number of immobile workers relative
to mobile human capital owners is higher. Although it is not possible to explicity derive the
level of transport costs,  f  , at which full agglomeration in one of the two countries obtains in
this model, an implicit condition can be obtained by setting the utility differential (9) equal to
zero and setting  1   . This condition reads:  
        
  / 2 1 1 ln
1 1     
  
f f f .
In the standard CP model with a Cobb-Douglas upper tier utility two qualitatively identical
linkages are at work. However, the CP model exhibits a ‘subcritical pitchfork bifurcation’ so
that internal asymmetric equilibria do not exist: only the symmetric equilibrium and/or full
agglomeration in one of the regions are stable equilibria. Intuitively, the bifurcations obtained
in new economic geography models are the result of a tension between centripetal and
centrifugal forces, in general. A subcritical pitchfork (supercritical pitchfork) results, when, as
an increasing amount of mobile factors relocates from the symmetric equilibrium, the
incentive for further relocation increases (decreases) (see Fujita et. al. 1999: 34f. and Puga
1999: 324). The difference between the present model and the standard CP model can now be
rationalised by noting that the quasi-linear upper tier utility, by channelling all income effects
to the numéraire sector, reduces the strength of the demand linkage compared to the Cobb-
Douglas case.11 This can be seen most clearly with the help of eq. (8). As noted before, the
only difference with a Cobb-Douglas upper tier utility is that the domestic and the foreign
aggregate incomes enter in the numerators of the two terms on the right-hand sides. In
comparing the two cases we therefore hold the denominators of (8) fixed and focus on these
numerators. Take the first equation of (8) and perform the thought experiment of relocating
one unit of human capital from the foreign to the domestic region starting from the symmetric
equilibrium. With the quasi-linear utility, the compensation of human capital owners in the
domestic region (R  on the left hand side) will then surely increase when transport costs are
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holds:   0 / *
2 2      V V  and         0 1 1 2 / 1 2 64 / *
4 3 3 3 3               V V . The formal conditions
characterising a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation are therefore fulfilled (Grandmont 1998: 49f.).
11 The supply linkage in the two models is determined by the way in which price level reductions affect the
indirect utilities: in the present model, the price levels enter in logarithmic form; in the CP model they enter with
an exponential weight of less than one (the Cobb-Douglas budget share spent on manufacturing goods). Hence, in
contrast to the demand linkages, the supply linkages are very similar in the two models.7
positive, and hence,  1   . With the Cobb-Douglas utility function this happens too, but this
effect is stronger because R  feeds back on domestic income (on the right hand side) and thus
reinforces the rise in R . Thus, the demand linkage is stronger in the Cobb-Douglas case. The
incentives for further relocation are therefore reinforced in the Cobb-Douglas case compared
to the case of the quasi-linear utility. This weakening of the demand linkage is sufficient to
generate the possibility of internal assymetric equilibria. It should be noted that such internal
asymmetric equilibria are also found in other recent papers. I interprete these findings as the
result of modifications of the standard CP model which incorporate centrifugal forces or
reduce centripetal forces: Helpman (1998) includes non-traded goods, Puga (1999) and Fujita
et. al. (1999, Ch. 14) allow for decreasing rather than constant returns to labour in the
production of the agricultural good and Ludema and Wooton (1998) assume limited factor
mobility. Arguably, the supercritical pitchfork is a more convincing description of some of the
concentration processes triggered by falling transport costs than the 'catastrophe' implied by
the subcritical pitchfork bifurcation.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a simple, analytically solvable, Chamberlinian agglomeration model
which departs from the canonical CP model in two respects. First, the fixed cost in the
manufacturing sector is assumed to consist of a separate internationally mobile factor (human
capital). Second, preferences of households are characterised by a quasi-linear upper tier
utility which eliminates income effects from the sector which has the potential to agglomerate.
Like the CP model, the present model contains two agglomerative forces, a supply and a
demand linkage. However, the model has the attractive feature to exhibit a 'supercritical
pitchfork bifurcation' rather than the catastrophic 'subcritical pitchfork bifurcation' of the CP
model. Moreover, due to its simplicity and analytical solvability, the model should be useful
in policy applications, notably in the fields of labor economics and public economics. This is
an important area of future work.
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Figure 1: International utility differential, human capital
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